The events of September 11, 2001 were tragic and will not soon be forgotten. And, while the security steps taken since then have undoubtedly discouraged similar attacks, the nation’s transportation systems, in fact our entire infrastructure, is still in jeopardy.

As we saw in New Orleans and more recently in Minneapolis, Mother Nature and design flaws can be just as devastating as acts of terrorism, especially when the infrastructure systems we are relying on lack resiliency and redundancy. While levee failures and a bridge collapse are extreme examples of failing infrastructure, the impact poor road conditions, an overtaxed energy grid and aging water mains have on our daily lives is just as real (just think of the helicopters having to rescue people off of River Road—that could have easily had a more tragic outcome).

There has been a lot of talk on this blog and all around Washington that if we fail to act on infrastructure legislation the flow of commerce will be slowed and the U.S. will loose its competitive edge – and I don’t disagree. But we can’t forget that failing infrastructure poses a threat to more than just the economy, it also poses a threat a public safety. We need to repair and upgrade what we already have to meet current safety standards and as we plan and design new infrastructure, it must be long lasting and resilient against all hazards – manmade and natural. Preventing acts of terrorism has been, and should continue to be a significant focus for the nation, but when it comes to infrastructure security, the answer has to be more than just “guns, gates and guards”.

We all hope that this country will never see such an event such as Sept. 11 again, and those of us in the transportation industry are certainly doing everything we can to learn from that tragedy as we move forward. But if we focus all of our attention and funding on preventing deliberate, manmade attacks, without also making a concentrated and sustained effort to improve the condition of the nation’s infrastructure using a multi-hazard approach to security, then we will remain vulnerable to the impact of failing infrastructure.

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I continue to be concerned about the Transportation Security Administration’s failure to convert to a more efficient and effective security screening approach.  Instead, the TSA has grown into a large bureaucracy of more than 61,000 employees nestled within a huge bureaucracy at DHS (16 Department Components, over 225,000 employees) that stifles innovation and private enterprise rather than embracing it.

Over the last eight years (with the agency already going on its fifth administrator) we have spent more than $35 billion creating a centralized TSA that has resulted in great inefficiencies and inflexibility with little improvement in screener effectiveness.  This money could have been much better spent on critical in-line baggage screening systems and advanced checkpoint screening technology. There is ample evidence that such technology and in-line systems significantly improve screening operations. Additionally, in-line baggage screening systems could reduce by as much as 78% the number of baggage screeners needed thereby saving the TSA millions of dollars annually.  The return on this investment is staggering. 

I believe it is difficult, if not impossible, to manage the hiring, deployment, training, and employment of over 50,000 screeners from Washington, D.C.  While I am not advocating the removal of Federal responsibility over airport screening, I believe it makes sense to decentralize the process and allow these operations to be conducted by the private sector with Federal standards, oversight and audits.  As long as the highest levels of security are provided, the details of how that is accomplished should be determined at the airport operational level. 

Allowing private companies to perform screening functions will allow for flexibility, efficiency, and cost-savings, as well as private sector innovation and forward thinking.  Aviation security is a Federal responsibility.  But the Federal government works best when setting policy and conducting oversight.   Allowing the private sector to provide screening services eliminates the existing conflict of interest where the Federal government acts as both the regulator and the regulated. 

Simply put, any transportation security agency that is the operator, administrator, regulator and auditor if its own function can never expect to be efficient or effective. 

Aviation remains a high-risk terrorist target, and I believe that explosives, particularly improvised devices carried on board aircraft by “clean bombers,” remains the number one risk.  Unfortunately, I see a huge gap in the nation’s airport security system and feel that it is critically important to address the problem and pursue much needed reforms. 

TSA and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports indicate that covert screening tests shown virtually no improvement in recent years.  While we are certainly more secure than we were prior to September 11, 2001, there is still a vital need for aviation security improvements.   

It is clear that it is time to replace the centralized bureaucracy and the thousands of screeners with the latest screening technology and the more efficient and effective Screening Partnership Program model. 

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I agree with my colleagues that eight years after the September 11 terrorist attacks we have better defenses and Norm Mineta and Michael Jackson are among those we have to thank for getting us to where we are. The application of technology to the screening of passengers and checked baggage is just one example where we have made great strides in transportation security. As others have indicated, I suspect we will continue to make technological improvements that address today and tomorrow’s vulnerabilities while better protecting the free flow of passengers and goods that is so vital to our way of life.

My principal concerns center on three other areas. The first and the most complex are the security management information systems we have to collect, analyze and assimilate threat information and get it to the right people in time to act. This “Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor” problem was unfortunately replayed on September 11 when government had the information it needed to head off an attack, but we did not have the management information systems capable of obtaining the right data from the right people in time to get information to law enforcement officials to thwart the hijackers (this is the kind of failure that often leads to absurd conspiracy theories). This tragic failure of mining, processing and using data was similar to the Firestone Tire/SUV Rollover safety issue of a decade back where accident data was not put together effectively enough in time to prevent a number of unnecessary highway deaths. With transportation security today, there are  indications that federal agencies are collaborating to a greater extent and, as a result, data is being more freely shared between critical Departments such as Justice and Homeland Security. However, the General Accountability Office and others assert that there is still a ways to go and I believe it will take determined and continuous efforts to get our systems calibrated correctly.

The second is that our national government needs to do a better job in working with state and local governments and the private sector on transportation security. Time after time over the last decade, federal agencies have attempted to dictate policy and regulate and operate out of Washington rather than leveraging all available federal, state, local and private resources in a combined effort. To be fair, some of this is attributable to the crisis atmosphere after September 11 and the push to do something quickly on aviation security, no matter what its cost or impediments to passenger and goods mobility. While congressional and regulatory policymaking has become more deliberative and measured since then, and commercial considerations have become better incorporated into decision-making (e.g., air cargo), the Department of Homeland Security still has a “Not Invented Here” mentality that needs to be discarded. If so, we would save money and enhance security. In practice this requires (1) better sharing of threat information, (2) checking with stakeholders and other governmental authorities about the range of alternatives to address the threats, and (3) leveraging the thousands of state and local law enforcement officers and working with their sponsors to multiply capabilities instead of deploying yet another federal agency to protect infrastructure that is already protected (e.g., airports). In this area culture and practice still have a long way to go.

The third is enhancing our cooperation with international organizations and other nations to better harmonize security and customs requirements. In the past couple of years we have made progress on initiatives such as C-TPAT and authorized economic operators (the European version) to address customs requirements, but in many areas (especially with security) our view of harmonization has either been “U.S. impose and other nations conform” or a requirement that goods be re-inspected anytime they enter the U.S. Fortunately practical realities and the idea of opportunity cost are beginning to catch up and many policymakers now are beginning to see the futility and inadvisability of mandates such as the 9/11 Commission Act’s that foreign seaports be required to scan 100 percent of the cargo entering the United States by 2012 (not to mention that its premise runs counter to C-TPAT). Another example is the re-screening of checked baggage for connecting flights as they arrive from advanced democratic nations such as Canada or the Netherlands. This is nonsensical and DHS and the State Department should start negotiating today about how we can either harmonize requirements or set standards through international bodies such as ICAO (the International Civil Aviation Organization).  Security policies that start with an assumption that harmonization and reciprocity are better than U.S. unilateralism would improve security, increase trade, better relations and save money. 

Steve Van Beek

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The railroad industry is a model for how to improve security. Following 9/11, railroads took the initiative to create a comprehensive rail security plan working closely with the federal intelligence community and security experts. Freight railroads quickly enacted more than 50 permanent security-enhancing countermeasures, a security alert level system with corresponding actions and enhanced intelligence sharing between federal agencies and railroads. 

The freight rail industry has worked constantly since 9/11 to address threats, close vulnerabilities and train emergency responders, and will continue to do so to maintain a high level of preparedness and resiliency.

Despite our best efforts, we can’t guarantee against terrorist acts, including assaults involving hazardous material shipments. Our record in moving hazardous materials safely is excellent and is a direct result of the importance railroads place on special operating procedures, technological advancements and advanced training for rail employees and local emergency responders. And until safer technologies are used as a substitute for these highly toxic substances, the nation’s railroads will remain the safest mode for the transportation of hazardous materials.

Our nation’s rail system remains vulnerable to a terrorist attack.  The rail workers we represent – locomotive engineers, trainmen, and track and bridge workers – still do not have adequate security training. They need to know how to thwart a train hijacking, an attack on critical rail infrastructure or the planting of a bomb on freight cars or passenger trains.

Rail lines routinely run through our major cities and towns carrying anhydrous ammonia, nuclear waste and other toxic chemicals. Freight rail corporations, however, still do not give fire and rescue operators real-time information about their trains’ cargo. Studies, such as the 2005 report generated by the Centers for Disease Control, showed that a release of a toxic gas carried on a rail car would result in “environmental damage, severe injury, or death.”

Terrorists continue to be interested in aviation as a target. Congress can help prevent a terrorist attack on airlines by passing HR 2200. The bill orders the Transportation Security Administration to issue long-overdue security standards for foreign repair stations comparable to domestic standards for air carriers and airports. The standards would cover background checks, access to aircraft and perimeter security.

This legislation would enhance airport security by requiring airport perimeter checks, 100 percent screening of air cargo, bag matches to passenger lists, air cargo crew training and uniform security background checks.

The legislation also creates a sensible approach to performing criminal

background checks for port and hazmat truck drivers, eliminating redundant checks and prohibiting states from requiring separate background checks for transportation security cards.

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Hearing from Norm Mineta and Michael Jackson reminds me of how much we owe them for their efforts in standing up the response to 9/11, which has in fact been successful and which we cannot walk away from.  The threats are still out there and our transportation system is still vulnerable as both a target and a carrier.  The terrorists will continue to probe our defenses for weaknesses and we need to be equally attentive to evolve our response.

Recognizing that this will be our state for a long time to come, we should be evaluating both our success and our evolved response for ways to improve.  There's no silver bullet, but improved technology has to be part of the answer.  It's the area in which our abilities overmatch the capabilities of evil doers and we need to keep a steady effort to develop and deploy new pieces of equipment and new techniques for using them.

At the same time, as we evaluate where we are, we need to assure that the appropriate balance is placed between the functioning of the security defenses and the effective movement of goods and people.  I continue to believe that there are win-win solutions out there, that contribute to both goals and to other collateral issues, such as Bill Graves' reminder that cargo theft (and even cargo loss) is a constant issue.  We won't find those joint opportunities unless the transportation practicioner is at the table with the security professional.  Let's contine to look for the ways that can happen.

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In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the trucking industry continues to actively support our nation’s goal of improving security while keeping our country and our economy moving forward. As part of our efforts, the industry is working with government and industry partners on initiatives to improve the security of both domestic and international cargo operations.  Moreover, we are at the forefront of efforts to establish partnerships with federal, state, and local governments to improve the sharing of information between private sector and public sector entities, and among various industry and economic sectors.

As an industry that faces other security concerns on a daily basis, such as cargo theft, we recognize that no level of defense can achieve perfect safety and security. However, we strongly believe that trucking companies can reduce the odds of being targeted by those who wish to harm us by increasing awareness among company personnel, implementing simple cost-effective security measures and developing a culture of security within our operations.

ATA is working to ensure that programs designed to augment our national security do not hinder our ability to provide transportation services to our customers. Enhancing security without disrupting the flow of commerce can be achieved by implementing risk-based programs in a cost-effective and coordinated manner.

At a time when the public and private sectors have limited resources, our security efforts must be focused on the most significant risks. At present, government agencies that administer various security programs in the transportation sector lack coordination, resulting in security programs with duplicative background checks and requirements that create unnecessary burden and cost. Also, multiple security plans and training requirements that govern the transportation of certain types of products and operations in specific areas threaten to erode the trucking industry’s ability to continue delivering the goods that the consumer expects.

ATA believes that the end goals of security and efficiency are not mutually exclusive. The trucking industry supports programs that help motor carriers increase the security and safety of their operations. More effective and efficient implementation of these programs will provide real security without disrupting the flow of commerce.

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The following was submitted by Susan Monteverde, Vice President, Government Relations for the American Association of Port Authorities:

In a word…yes…our transportation system is safer since implementing the many security policies and programs called for after 9/11. Looking at America’s seaports specifically, from the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 to the SAFE Port Act of 2006, billions of government, port authority and private-sector dollars have been invested to enhance the ports’ ability to thwart terrorism and protect people and cargo from malicious intent. These investments have ranged from guards, fences and sophisticated surveillance cameras, to federal ID cards with embedded biometrics required by anyone needing unescorted access to secure port areas.

Security is one of the highest priorities for the America’s seaports. Protecting the people and freight that move through our seaport borders and their surrounding communities is essential to keeping the country safe and open for business. AAPA and its members collaborate with both government officials and private-sector security experts to maintain and enhance seaport security because protecting our borders is a shared responsibility.

While the federal government has made significant inroads in protecting our shores from entry of illicit cargo and those who wishing us harm, the lion’s share of the financial burden for protecting port facilities remains on the ports themselves.

Since 9/11, Congress has appropriated more than $2 billion to pay for security equipment, infrastructure and training to help harden port facilities against terrorism. While this figure may seem large, it pales in comparison to the costs that ports and their private-sector partners have had to shoulder, such as the 25% cost-share match for security grants, together with the costs for long-term equipment operations and maintenance, and wages for security personnel, which aren’t covered by the grants

The 25% cost-share for public agencies is a significant economic disincentive to make security enhancements and implement regional maritime security plans. In these tight economic times, the cost-share is an even greater problem as ports are cutting back in all areas to address economic shortfalls. The Port Security Grant program is one of the few DHS grant programs that require a cost-share. Transit grants, for example, are exempt from cost-share requirements.

Both 2002 and 2006 maritime security acts provided that operation and maintenance costs are an allowable expense under the Port Security Grant program. However, DHS has narrowly interpreted this to only allow maintenance on a grant-funded project within the term of the grant; thereby limiting its usefulness. For example, under a three-year grant, it may take two years to install a camera system; therefore, the maintenance contract would only cover the final year of the grant. By clarifying that grant money can be used to purchase service contracts for maintenance agreements on past federal projects as well, the growing burden to maintain these projects can be more equally shared.

Finally, DHS should allow grant funds to be used for security personnel costs, as provided in the 2002 and 2006 security bills. Doing so would mirror both the Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant programs. Ports should be allowed to hire new security personnel (e.g., staff for operations, emergency centers, planning and counterterrorism posts, etc.) for the term of the grant. Personnel costs should also be permitted to backfill salaries for approved training programs.

Effective port security is an evolving process, requiring full commitment from all partners to ensure that weaknesses and weak spots aren’t exploited by those plotting to do us harm. When the federal government assumes its rightful share in protecting our ports and the transportation system that feeds them, we’ll be better able to adapt to the threats ahead of us without further diminishing the velocity of goods through the supply chain that feeds our economy and way of life.

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The first thing we need to realize is that there is no such thing as absolute security. Dedicated opponents, willing to die for their cause, have an inherent advantage over those who value life and that divide is almost impossible to breach.

But while there has been a global mandate to increase security--especially for air transport--those standards are arbitrary and variable from location to location. In Abu Dhabi I was surprised at having to surrender my safety razor and in China, though my liquids were in a baggie, the baggie could not be in hand luggage. I can fly 12 hours from Capetown to Frankfurt and then be required to again be screened by Germans in order to continue my journey and, at the time I did so, the South African wine allowed for the long flight was suddenly a threat and had to be discarded. This patchwork of inane differences is unnecessary and servile to bureaucracy rather than security.

Finally, the US continues to make security a quasi-military function instead of a police and investigative one. Meaningful progress has been made in places that believe that the bad guys should be tracked and caught before the security line while in the US conformity to the rules is the ultimate pass-fail arbiter.

We can do so much better than wanding babies.

Sept. 11, 2001 marked a significant change in the way the American people think about security in a complex world. One of the most publicly visible areas of change, of course, is the government’s assuming its proper role as the leader and director of a multi-layered, all encompassing, aviation-security program, which constantly adapts to meet a changing situation. This, of course, includes the obvious passenger, baggage and cargo screening programs, but also runs far deeper and wider to include a vast array of activities designed to "harden" targets, and to both understand and deter the nature of the threats we are confronting.

One lesson that stands out in the last eight years is the increasing recognition of the imperative for a risk-based management approach to security across our society. In a world of limited resources, but with an adaptive and resourceful set of possible adversaries, clearly the message is that we need to use our security resources as prudently as possible. Doing things that simply "seem like a good idea" can often lead to poor and excessively draining security that, in the long run, can actually weaken us overall. The airline industry is committed to working with our partners in government, across all transportation sectors and with all stakeholders in our society to find the optimal set of security solutions. Aviation security will continue to improve with sharply focused diligent effort.

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Transportation Security: Little Bang for the Buck

Eight years ago, Congress enacted the Aviation & Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001 in great haste, with very little prior study or research. The overwhelming political need was to reassure the voting public that something was being done to prevent a repeat of the horrible commandeering of airliners as weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, despite having the words “transportation security” in its title, ATSA devoted the vast majority of its mandates and funding to commercial aviation security. That not only leaves gaping vulnerabilities in other transportation modes but also focuses far too much aviation security resources on keeping dangerous objects off airliners rather than making all of aviation less vulnerable.

A major problem inherent in dealing with security against terrorism via political means is the tendency to focus what are always scarce resources on highly visible efforts—what some have termed “security theater.” The alternative is to base security policy on serious risk analysis, putting resources where they achieve the greatest bang for the buck. That kind of analysis in aviation security suggests that spending $4 billion per year on screening every passenger and bag (rather than focusing resources more on higher-risk passengers) and stationing air marshals on airliners are not cost-effective uses of security dollars. If we spent less of these resources on security theater and more on preventing airfield perimeters from being breached and lobbies from being targeted by suicide bombers, we’d likely be better off. And by the same token, serious risk analysis might suggest spending relatively less on aviation security and relatively more on rail and cargo security.

Ultimately, countering domestic terror threats via a strategy of target-hardening is a losing proposition. A wealthy free society is inherently a target-rich environment—and we cannot afford to spend a sizeable fraction of our GDP hardening every possible target. The more we focus large sums on building a few hardened “Maginot Lines,” the more terrorists can shift to less-hardened or un-hardened targets—whether fuel storage facilities, long-distance power lines, or shopping malls. This suggests that a significant fraction of whatever we can afford to spend should be spent on intelligence work and counter-terrorist efforts rather than target-hardening.

Readers interested in my assessment of what a more risk-based approach to aviation security would look like can consult my recent paper for the OECD/International Transport Forum, “Toward Risk-Based Aviation Security,” Discussion Paper No. 2008-23, available on the ITF website: www.internationaltransportforum.org.

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Eight years after the attack, transportation security in America is decisively stronger, yet we are still far too vulnerable.  We continue to face a ruthless, determined and very patient enemy – and many others inspired by dangerous extremism.  Worse, too many Americans suffer terrorism fatigue.   Too many of us tire of standing permanent watch.

Let’s start with the good news.  All modes of transportation are more secure.  And perhaps equally important, better prepared to respond and recover from attack.  Commercial aviation, the locus of the 9/11 assault, has perhaps come the greatest distance.  TSA is a substantial force.  It is populated with thousands of women and men who have made it much harder to attack.  Federal, state and local law enforcement and homeland security leaders are better trained and more capable of dealing with terrorist threats.  

Maritime domain awareness has improved and global cooperation among industry and governments has increased.  The same can be said for surface transportation, particularly transit and rail.   We have slowly yet steadily improved our federal institutions.  Not only the Department of Homeland Security, but, critically, the intelligence community, the FBI, the Department of Defense and other domestic departments and agencies are more capable of dealing with threats, and better at working with each other.  Ditto with state and local relationships.     

But finding the right balance between security and mobility both for people and freight is a challenge in a vast and economically diverse nation such as ours.  It is simply impossible in a democracy to diminish risk to an insignificant level.  For all we have spent on commercial aviation security, one or two well-placed shoulder fired missiles could have catastrophic consequences.  Airport lobbies simply cannot be made impervious to attack.  Air cargo security does still need improvement.  TSA is vastly underfunded and thus unable to acquire needed technology that would improve security, increase operational efficiency and improve customer service. 

While we have improved transit security, the structural vulnerability of some of our older subway systems is worrisome.  Wherever large numbers of people gather, risk abounds.  Ocean container security is still in its early days of improvement, desperately needing a meaningful global information exchange network to improve security profiling for each inbound container.  My purpose is not to catalogue the most compelling vulnerabilities, rather to suggest that much more remains to be done.

Will we have the gumption to continue to make good progress?  As the hours of 9/11 turned to the earliest hours of 9/12, DOT Secretary Norm Mineta finally got a moment alone with his deputy secretary.  Before the cock crowed, the Secretary predicted that we would, as a nation, marshal unparalleled energy to invest in strengthening transportation security.  The country quickly did just that.  Thousands stepped forward, eager to help.  But he also predicted, to give just one example, that even as we would build a new Federal Air Marshal organization virtually from scratch, its budget would soon enough become the target of naïve Congressional budget-cutters.  Others would weary of the intrusiveness of increased security. 

Sure enough, this summer a senior Member stood up on the floor of the House of Representatives to assert that “the most needless, useless agency in the entire Federal government is the Air Marshal Service.”  He blithely conceded “I know none of its employees.”  I, however, do know well many of these dedicated men and women.  The Congressman felt that because so few individuals had actually been arrested by Air Marshals, the cost per arrest made the entire agency just horribly excessive.  That is akin to measuring the value of our nuclear inventory built during the Cold War by how many bombs we actually dropped.   

Investing in deterrence is not a luxury, it is an obligation.  Yes, it is terribly expensive to defend this nation from this enemy.  Moreover, it takes time to mature the institutions needed for homeland security.  Continuous innovation is required, animated by a sense of urgency about threat.

Eight years after the 9/11, we are at a turning point.  Will America be as patient and focused as our enemies?  Will we invest to find the right balance between security and mobility?  Will the next attack on our soil provoke recrimination, bitter partisanship and finger-pointing?  Or will we close ranks and defend ourselves as a unified, strong nation? 

The peril we face from radical extremism will not diminish; instead, it will likely increase and be passed to the next generation and beyond.  In justice and hope we honor the victims of 9/11 each year with solemnity and our prayers.  In doing so, we are reminded also to renew our resolve to defend the homeland against the despicable villainy of terrorism. 

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America is light years ahead of where it was on 9/11. Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) within months after the tragedy, which revolutionized safety in passenger aviation travel in particular. Also, passenger baggage screening is in much better shape than before.

Travel screening today is working well. We continue to tweak the system so that security does not have a negative impact on passenger convenience or speed through security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is doing a good job relating to people going through the process. The big issue is that terrorists only need to get it right once, while TSA has to get it right every time.

Regardless, you can't let an absolute idea of security impair travel, tourism, and convenience. TSA has to take risk management into consideration as they carry out their security responsibilities.

The proof of the current approach is in the pudding: In eight years, we have not had any terrorist actions in a U.S. airport.

There are other areas where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to make improvements, including air cargo screening, rail security, and maritime containers coming into our ports. DHS is pursuing through science and technology new and more effective means of detection of and monitoring for security violations. DHS has the overall responsibility through memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and cooperation through the Federal departments, and they are using that responsibility well.

Overall, those who have this awesome responsibility - the security of the American people - want to be able to assure the public that they are safe, but not impinge upon their freedom of mobility.

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