Expert blogger Robert Crandall, whose response to this week's question is just below, is too modest. He neglected to mentioned that he is among a group of prominent aviation and security experts named to a blue-ribbon panel by the U.S. Travel Association "to create a vision for the world's most secure, efficient and customer-friendly air travel security screening process." Here's the link to the association's press release:

http://www.ustravel.org/news/press-releases/experts-align-create-new-vision-air-travel-security-screening-process

Unhappily, not very well at all. The agencies continue to ignore the reality that the actions we have and are taking are reactive rather than proactive and to ignore the need to sensibly differentiate between high and low risk passengers.

The recent decision to equip all checkpoints with full body scanners -- which cost $130,000 plus and add 30 to 45 seconds to each passenger screening -- is a case in point. The use of full body scanners on all passengers is a prodigous waste of the public's money and time.

We would be far better off using the dollars being allocated to acquiring full body scanners to broaden the security zone in and around airports, enhance our IT and personnel resources to enable better use of intelligence inputs, develop standards to seperate high and low risk passengers and work more closely with other countries to establish and adopt uniform security standards.

There is no more challenging job in government than running the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) -- with the possible exception of running Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The relationship over the past many years has been rocky at times, but communications (in both directions) between airports and DHS/TSA has improved greatly. But there is still work to be done. Specifically:

1. There is an ongoing need to coordinate security initiatives, including new security requirements, with industry. In so doing, we can increase the chance of success of new efforts. The best example is after the liquid explosives plot was uncovered in 2006. Unfortunately, we don't always have this level of coordination, however, and it leads to further problems down the line. This has been true over time when security directives have been used in instances when a rulemaking or other proposed regulatory change would have been more appropriate, and ensured more industry input. These incidents have declined in recent months, which is a good thing and for which I commend TSA.

2. DHS and its agencies must resist the temptation to believe that working with airlines equates to working with industry. Airports are the critical link in the chain, and must be included -- whether domestic or international. They are also the public face of aviation in a community and can greatly assist in helping to educate passengers about new security initiatives. DHS has not always included airports in the discussion, though that is also beginning to improve. And it is in airlines' best interests for all to be involved.

3. Routinely evaluate security measures for currency/applicability. The aviation sector has been at Orange Alert for several years now and some of security measures at that status are starting to become stale. ACI-NA proactively commenced what we call an In-Depth Security Review to examine all the things we are doing and identify those that are stale, could be improved, have outlived their usefulness and so on. TSA has partnered with us in this endeavor. To be effective security must remain fresh and current, with an element of randomness.

4. DHS and TSA should provide the industry timely intelligence updates and information. This should be done at a macro level and also, where needed, at particular airports. When I first took this job such information was not always provided, but this has improved greatly in recent years. In the past, measures would be imposed on the system and airports had no idea why. There may be some times when the "why" question can't be answered, but that's not always the case. It is better when we have an understanding of the threat basis behind particular security initiatives, when that can be done.

5. There is a need to develop internationally recognized security technology standards. These cannot be imposed by the US; they must be harmonized in a true partnership with the international community. This should result in more effective screening technology at a lower cost. Again, it is critical that airports be involved in the development of any such standards.

6. We must more fully embrace and implement a risk management approach. When I visited Israel last year for an airport security tour, I heard this term over and over again -- risk management. To some in the political world, this may connote a "reduction" in security, but the truth is that it is just the opposite. This is how we enhance security. If TSA or some other agency is engaged in activities that do not truly address the risks we face, then I would argue security is reduced, even if “more” is being done. DHS and its family of agencies must be focused on addressing true risks. "More" is not the issue. "Better" is.

I thought folks might be interested to read this press release from DHS about Secretary Napolitano's recent meeting with top officials from several Asian and Pacific Rim countries and from ICAO on strengthening aviation security in the region.

Here's the link: Secretary, Asia/Pacific Counterparts Meet to Bolster International Aviation Security

Within the parameters that have been set, there is some progress--or at least a willingness to recognize the need for change. However, the US response to terror has, from the outset, been cast as a war, with a military response needed. The rest of the world generally sees terrorists as criminals and requiring police action.

Some years ago I was at a conference where some US muckey-muck and a Canadian counterpart were speaking. The American spoke of battles while the Canadian talked about investigation. When I spoke with the Canadian later and asked about the difference, he cited the difference in perception and the fact that most nations saw the US stand as more belligerent than helpful, but because of the rules established by the US for carriers operating there, the same investment needed to be made at airports. Nonetheless, Canada continued to believe that police work, not airport intrusion, was the most effective.

The failure to act on available intellegence was the real culprit in Christmas Day. If the system is ever to really be cost effective, we need to spend more on getting into minds and less on getting into underwear.

About six months ago, we addressed the question of “how can we improve transportation security.” In that post I identified three management priorities for Secretary Napolitano and for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). It is unfortunate that TSA has been without an administrator since the change of administrations and hopefully Robert Harding’s nomination will be considered soon. Notwithstanding that fact, the Administration has made progress in two of the three identified areas.

The three management priorities were to (1) upgrade security management information systems to better assimilate and analyze threat information, (2) better partner with state and local governments and the private sector to leverage off their resources rather than attempt to dictate policy, regulate and operate out of Washington, and (3) enhance cooperation with international organizations and other nations to better harmonize security and customs requirements, recognizing that the movement of passengers and goods occurs internationally and that our security is only as good as the weakest link in the network.

Since that time, it is clear that the Obama Administration has emphasized (1) above and is working with Congress to balance several elements in the process including privacy, technological capabilities, and staff capacity (recent congressional hearings on this subject have been encouraging). As one analyst said it is not difficult to find out after the fact that there was enough information to be concerned about the intent of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the terrorist who attempted to bomb the Amsterdam to Detroit flight). The trick is to collect the information, sift through the millions of data points, analyze the data and identify threats, and get defensive measures to the appropriate authorities prior to the flight. Since the Christmas incident, the DHS leadership has travelled the world trying to get increased cooperation on the sharing of data to improve security. This is the right thing to do and it will improve security.

Hopefully, Mr. Harding’s background in intelligence signals an important change at TSA: moving from what many of us feel is an overemphasis on technological approaches to aviation security to one that uses technology in conjunction with principles of risk management. Such an approach would help, for example, in the way the Administration is rolling out the use advanced imaging technology.

I continue to believe that the Administration is not placing enough emphasis on (2) above. In speaking with airport directors from around the nation, many feel that TSA is devoting too much of its resources in conducting non-screening operations at airports instead of relying on airport authorities (and what is an excellent record on security). TSA’s job should be to regulate airport security not micro-manage it or operate all of it. Why, for example, should TSA personnel walk airport garages looking for threats when the far more logical course would be to regulate the airports’ security responsibilities (e.g., the airport’s public areas, including parking lots)? If there are airports not adequately performing their jobs, then the Federal Security Director should work with the specific airport to improve security, including the use of enforcement tools if necessary. Otherwise TSA should leverage its resources and stick to what are clearly federal responsibilities. As several of us have recommended in the past, one sensible way of reforming DHS’s structure would be to create a separate Transportation Screening Organization (for screening and other operational responsibilities) and separate it from a new TSA dedicated to policymaking, regulation and enforcement. This is consistent with good public administration practice.

In contrast, if Secretary Napolitano’s schedule and statements are any indication, DHS and TSA have placed a high priority on (3) working with international organizations such as ICAO and IATA as well as the EU and individual nations to improve security. Recognizing that aviation is a global network and airports such as Amsterdam’s Schiphol are not only gateways to the United States, but connecting hubs serving hundreds of international cities and millions of passengers, is a critical realization. Marrying diplomacy and an international approach with (1) security management information systems is the right thing to do and I’m delighted that the Administration appears to be doing it.