Earlier this week, I participated in the Twentieth ACI World Annual General Assembly, where airports around the world gathered in Bermuda to discuss international aviation issues. As you would imagine, there was a lot of discussion about cargo security and the need for governments to work with airports, airlines, freight forwarders and the shipping community. The following resolution supporting a risk-based response was passed. North America airports also support the need to increase research and development for technologies that enhance cargo security.

Airports Support A Risk-Based Response To Recent Threats To Civil Aviation And A Secure Supply Chain Approach To Air Cargo Security

The Twentieth ACI World Annual General Assembly,

Notes the recent reports of attempts to sabotage aircraft and to attack facilities on the ground through improvised explosive devices concealed in consignments of air cargo,

Deplores all such attacks against civil aviation,

Recognises the proportionality of the response by regulators to the current situation, which has necessitated additional measures as an interim arrangement but seeks to ensure continuing measures are justified by a risk assessment based on available intelligence and be in proportion to the scale and scope of the problem,

Notes that the expeditious flow of cargo is essential to the global economy and that air cargo typically involves high value and time critical consignments,

Notes that airports play a crucial role in the global supply chain with more than 80 million tonnes of air cargo flowing through its member airports annually,

Notes that a high percentage of the air cargo is shipped in pre-palleted consignments and often involves inter-modal transfers within the supply chain,

Notes that a high percentage of air cargo travels on passenger aircraft but also on all-freighter aircraft,

Recognises that air cargo needs to be subjected to risk-based security controls to ensure that it does not present a risk to the safety of civil aviation operations or persons on the ground,

Notes that cargo consignments are also protected by customs requirements and commercial security arrangements designed to prevent unlawful interference or theft,

Notes that good counter-terrorist intelligence provides the foundation for effective aviation security,

Believes that while the security of air cargo is primarily the responsibility of the air carriers and the shippers transporting it, airports must be included in discussions regarding changes to existing security arrangements that affect airports,

Notes that it is often impracticable to screen cargo at airports, particularly when the cargo is already made up in bulk, pre-palleted consignments arriving from other modes of transport or from airports in other States,

Believes that the end-to-end supply chain needs to be secured, so that the integrity of consignments is established at the entry point to the supply chain and is then maintained through a chain of custody,

Recognises that for the secure supply chain to be implemented effectively, it will require a framework of standards that facilitate mutual recognition of equivalent measures by regulators and entities in the supply chain,

Reaffirms ACI’s commitment to work with ICAO, Regional and National authorities and industry stakeholders to strengthen the security measures for civil aviation operations,

And

1. Supports a risk-based response to the threats to civil aviation and, where needed, the implementation of additional preventive security measures, as an interim arrangement.

2. Calls on ICAO, Regional and National authorities to work with customs control authorities and industry stakeholders, to expedite work to establish the framework of standards necessary to strengthen the secure supply chain in civil aviation.

3. Calls on ICAO, Regional and National authorities to increase the resources for the research and development into technologies that will facilitate enhancements in the security controls to air cargo.

Below is a statement issued Wednesday from the Department of Homeland Security about the government's response to the foiled terrorist attack earlier this week. Highlights: enhanced screening and training.

"Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano today spoke with leaders from global shipping companies, including UPS, DHL, FedEx and TNT, to discuss enhanced air cargo screening and security efforts following last week’s disrupted attempt to conceal and ship explosive devices onboard aircraft bound for the United States.

During the call, Secretary Napolitano underscored her commitment to partnering with the shipping industry to strengthen cargo security through enhanced screening and preventative measures, including terrorism awareness training for personnel. Together, UPS, DHL, FedEx and TNT employ more than one million employees in hundreds of countries around the world.

Following her call with shipping industry leaders, Secretary Napolitano spoke with International Air Transport Association (IATA) Director General Giovanni Bisignani about the Department's continued collaboration with our private sector partners and international allies to secure the global supply chain through a layered security approach to identify, deter and disrupt threats. She also reiterated her commitment to ongoing coordination with the airline and shipping industries to uphold TSA security standards, including the vetting of personnel with access to cargo, employee training, and cargo screening procedures."

The discovery of two apparent bombs being shipped on cargo planes seems likely to set off a whole new wave of fighting the last war—i.e. enacting costly, poorly-thought-out regulations based on the specifics of a new incident. Initial U.S. government reactions—sending two USAF F-15’s to escort Emirates flight 201 from the UAE into JFK Airport last Friday and a ban effective Nov. 2 on passengers carrying printer toner cartridges in carry-on bags—look to me like pure security theater. And the ever-vigilant Rep. Ed Markey (D, MA), author of the 2007 law mandating that all belly cargo on passenger planes be physically screened, has announced he will push for new legislation to require 100% physical screening of all air cargo, period.

Before we go off half-cocked on yet more such regulations, it might be worthwhile to pause and ask several questions. First, assuming this latest incident was an Al Qaeda project, what might have been its real purpose? Initial AP and CNN reports on the “bomb” intercepted in the U.K. suggested that it was a toner cartridge with wires and a circuit board attached in a way that “made it resemble an improvised bomb,” but no explosives were found. Even if one or both intercepted devices did include explosives, the intended objective is obscure: to damage a passenger plane, to damage a cargo plane, or to damage the intended recipient in Chicago? Or something else?

What no one seems to have considered is that this stunt, including crude “bombs” and a convenient tip-off, may have been intended not to blow anything up but to panic politicians into enacting draconian regulations intended to cause large-scale economic damage to international goods-movement.

Physically screening all air cargo entering the United States and all domestic air cargo flown on freighters would be hugely costly and disruptive to our economy. One major problem is that the TSA cannot dictate inspection requirements for overseas airports from which numerous cargo flights originate. So a global program like the TSA’s Certified Cargo Screening Program (for domestic belly cargo) is highly unlikely for incoming air cargo. But the alternative of physically inspecting all incoming cargo when it is unloaded at U.S. airports is nightmarishly complex and costly. Most of what comes in on cargo planes arrives on pallets or in shipping containers—and TSA has yet to certify any screening technology that can reliably inspect such large items. The alternative of unpacking them would require massive new on-airport facilities and would thoroughly gum-up air-cargo logistics, potentially wrecking the economics of time-sensitive air cargo. Accomplishing that could well be Al Qaeda’s real objective.

But let’s suppose this misguided effort were actually put into place over the next five years or so. How might Al Qaeda respond? Not by trying to send more bombs on cargo planes but in any number of other ways: assisting domestic terrorists to bomb sports venues, shopping malls, or any of millions of other targets; bringing in bad stuff in maritime containers (whose volume dwarfs air cargo) or by rail and truck from Canada and Mexico (proven channels used by smugglers of people and drugs).

It’s high time we stopped playing this nasty and expensive game. The limited funds this country has for homeland security would be far better spent, first of all, on better intelligence on terrorist groups and continued strikes against their leaders and infrastructure. In addition, we should cease pretending that any target-hardening strategy could ever be 100% effective and, instead, devote more of our security resources to beefing up resiliency and recovery capabilities.

Here's an excerpt from a statement by Rep. John Mica, R-Fla., who is expected to chair the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee next year if Republicans win control of the House.

Mica helped create the Transportation Security Administration after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and he since has repeatedly lambasted it for being top-heavy and having misaligned priorities. The recent terrorist threat gives more ammunition to his arguments, and he can be expected to wield his power next year to win concessions from TSA.

U.S. Rep. John L. Mica (R-FL), the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Republican leader, said, “Once again we have a stark reminder that, whether a shoe bomb, liquid bomb, underwear bomb, or package bombs, all originating from foreign locations, terrorists are still trying to penetrate our security systems. Our security measures are still reactionary, rather than the proactive steps I have called for in the past.

“Rather than dedicating personnel and resources to pat down little old ladies and citizens who pose no threat, we should be directing our resources to where the real threat exists: foreign departure sites.

“We need to dramatically increase our security presence at international departure sites and establish better security protocols for foreign locations.

“It is not necessary to spend more money to address the threats. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is top heavy, with roughly 3,500 administrative employees in the Washington, D.C. area. With proper realignment of personnel and resources, the TSA could adjust its priorities to better protect us from the multiple threats seen from abroad. After the Christmas Day Bomber, we learned that the TSA has very few security personnel overseas and I called for a realignment of personnel at that time. I am again calling for the TSA to align it resources to meet security threats.